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The Clash of Christological Symbols: 
A Case for Metaphoric Realism 
Robert Masson 
In musical composition, a clash of cymbals signifies a dramatic 
moment in a passage. But its significance can vary. The force of brass 
plates can simply call attention to a phrase, voice, anthem, or transi-
tion in the arrangement. It can emphasize a thematic development, a 
musical notation anticipating a later twist or crescendo-or indicate 
that climax itself. It can signal a harmonious resolution of previous 
chords, or a rhapsody of dissonant voices. There are the occasions 
when a clash of cymbals heralds an extraordinary expression of musi-
cal creativity and genius: an adventitious musical gesture that brings 
together quite different voices in a way that enables the composition 
to express itself in a new idiom. At such moments cymbals announce 
a new musical vocabulary, a new form of expression. It is not just that 
something unexpected is said. The juxtaposition of the di sparate voices 
creates a way to say something that could not have been said before. 
What it expresses is made possible only through the arrangement's 
invention of new possibilities of meaning created by its forcing a com-
bination of musical phrases that until this composition had not been 
envisioned. The audience hears something it has never heard before-
and could not have been expected to hear until this musical passage 
itself created the space for the hearing. 
Such compositions can be extremely demanding for the audience. 
Understanding these pieces requires a stretch of sensibilities, a flex-
ibility of affection, and suppleness of comprehension--even a refor-
mation of one's register of meanings. Some in the gallery might not 
get the point. Others might not appreciate it. But for those who do, the 
clash of cymbals signals the advent of new meaning. The disparate 
voices are not reduced to one or the other-not harmonized in a famil-
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iar resolution. The uncalled-for juxtaposition is much more than a ca-
cophonous celebration of dissonance. The composition is inspired, a 
revelation. That is what happens, for example, in great symphonies 
and great jazz. Indeed, symphony and jazz as distinct genres are them-
selves inventions of such musical genius. 
The clash of christological symbols signals comparable dynamics 
in the movements of Christian thinking and discourse. The New Tes-
tament attests to a variety of images and potential trajectories for com-
prehending the significance of Jesus. Clashes among them preoccu-
pied theological concerns for the flfst four centuries. The "official 
libretto and score" views the resolution of the christological and re-
lated trinitarian debates as a thematic progression-in Catholic par-
lance, as a development of doctrine. The earlier clashes call attention 
to distinct voices whose disparate and incomplete insights are harmo-
nized at Nicaea and ChaIcedon. The councils' determinations of phras-
ing provide the foundational chords and so are normative for subse-
quent advances. Still, progression is possible, even necessary, because 
of the inherent tension between the chordal elements. The councils 
resolved that the human and divine notes must be played together, but 
in the definition of Chacedon, "unmixed and unchanged, undivided 
and unseparated.'" The terms are inescapably contrapuntal and analo-
gous. Hence, as Rahner famously emphasized, ChaIcedon is a begin-
ning rather than an end for further theological meditation and devel-
opment.2 
Roger Haight's Jesus Symbol of God argues for an emended li-
bretto and score.) As he sees it, the official rendition glosses the plu-
rality of discordant voices in the New Testament. The scenario is not 
attentive to the genesis of the phrases intoned at Nicaea and ChaIcedon, 
and so mistakes the movement' s finale for the originating notes that it 
was meant to express. Haight contends that attention to the history of 
the controversies establishes that the original meaning that generated 
the christological formulas of the councils was not-and is not- iden-
tical to the formulations themselves, and indeed should be distinguished 
from them. Moreover, the official story line takes the movement to-
ward that particular paradigm, the incarnation of the divine Logos in 
the human as sarx or anthropos, as a necessary and normative devel-
opment. So doing precludes as orthodox any interpretations of Jesus' 
significance that appeal for inspiration and resources to voices in the 
New Testament that do not fit thi s pattern. 
Haight challenges the notion that these developments were inevi-
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table. This scenario is especially problematic, he alleges, because it 
does not render an account that ean speak credibly to the rustorical 
sensibilities of postmodern consciousness. He insists that the problem 
is not with what Chalcedon intended and affLrmed (the divinity and 
salvific significance of Jesus) but with the theoretical tools the council 
had at its disposal to express its intention. While the council played 
the divine and human notes as contrapuntal, Hrught c1rums that the 
incarnate Logos paradigm did not provide the means to insure that the 
counterpoint would be clearly heard in subsequent generations and 
theologies. Indeed, the attempted counterpoint appears inevitably to 
resolve to a diminished humanity. Hence, if one is to take seriously 
Jesus ' humanity and contemporary conceptions of what full humanity 
entails, the official score poses impossible conceptual dilemmas. 
Haight' s revisionist libretto and score put forward a detailed, mul-
tifaceted, and provocative strategy for defending in our present con-
text the affirmation that Jesus is divine and savior. I propose a third 
libretto and score as a clarification of the official analogical reading 
and as an alternative to Hrught's dialectical and symbolic reading. The 
trurd possibility is a metaphoric reading. Metaphoric, as distinct from 
metaphorical , refers to an epistemological process that creates the 
possibility for new meanings, illustrated, for example, by the previous 
description of the creation of a new musical idiom. 
The role of the metaphoric process in generating such new under-
standings in science and theology has been analyzed in some depth by 
Mary Gerhart and Allan Russel1.4 Metaphoric process, in the specific 
sense in which they define it, offers a more effective way to explain 
the Christian affirmation of identity between Jesus and God-more 
effective because it suggests how to mruntain credibly the realism of 
both the identity claim and the affirmation of Jesus' full humanity, 
while also accounting for the ways in which these affirmations stretch 
language to new uses and stretch believers to new horizons of under-
standing and action. 
While I acknowledge, then, the considerable merit in Hrught' s con-
tention that the issue of how language, concepts, and realities signify 
God is a decisive one for contemporary christologies, my consider-
ations vie for a different Libretto on that same issue. Hrught's extended, 
systematic analysis confronts a number of issues that are problematic 
today for many thoughtful people and that are not convincingly ex-
plained by academic theology or adequately addressed by church pro-
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nouncements. But my aim is not an appraisal of these broader issues 
in Haight' s proposals, or of his christology as such or as a whole. 
Reservations about key aspects in only one of the many lines of argu-
mentation he advances prompt my suggestions and provide the con-
text for developing them. My purpose is narrow: to sketch an outline 
of a constructive alternative for understanding the logic of Christian 
talk about Jesus' significance. 
For our purposes, three moves are crucial in Haight' s efforts to 
retrieve the authentic meaning behind Nicaea and Chalcedon, and to 
articulate an alternative orthodox christology. First, he argues that 
symbolic mediation provides the key for interpreting religious lan-
guage and for explaining Jesus' significance. Second, he assumes that 
the coherence between Paul Tillich 's and Karl Rahner's theologies of 
the symbol is sufficient to warrant a relatively undifferentiated appro-
priation of their positions in support of the first thesis. Third, he ar-
gues that a genetic interpretation of scriptural and patristic christological 
formulations precludes unwarranted extensions of their senses beyond 
the meanings that generated them. 
There is something of a circularity to Haight 's argument-legiti-
mately so-and he acknowledges it. That applies to the three concep-
tual moves at issue here. His appropriation of TiUich and Rahner de-
termines his understanding of symbol , which in turn shapes his genetic 
interpretation of christology, his critique and revision of Rahner's 
christology, and hi s constructive argument for a Spirit christology. To 
this I add that Tillich ' s and Rahner's theologies of symbol are both 
instances of what Gerhart and Russell have described as metaphoric 
process. This addition enlarges the interpretive circle and complicates 
further the question about the most appropriate point of entry into the 
discussion. Haight 's conflation of Tillich ' s and Rahner's theologies 
of symbol suggests itself as an opportune ingress. It is not the most 
important of these issues, nor is it illegitimate to appropriate compat-
ible insights from otherwise contrary arguments . But the conflation 
does offer a direct path to the divergence between my metaphoric and 
Haight' s symbolic librettos. 
Conflation of Tillich's and Rahner's Theologies of Symbol 
Although Haight's theory of the symbolic draws on numerous 
sources, it appeals particularly to Tillich and Rahner. There is no ques-
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lion that there are strikjng parallels in their phenomenological charac-
terizations of symbol and the symbolic. The issue that demands atten-
tion is the fundamental djfference between their approaches. In Dy-
namics of Theology, Haight admits that he brings "together in what 
may appear to be a too smooth and easy way elements" from their 
theologies of symboLS He adds, though, that "despite these djfferences, 
I see no fundamental antithesis between these two theologies of sym-
bol. Rather I see Rahner much more willing to emphasize the ' is ' side 
of the dialectic between symbol and symbolized, especially in the case 
of the concrete symbol Jesus."6 The important point, he insists, is that 
"the dialectical structure is still present in Rahner's christology, de-
spite his tendency to emphasize Jesus ' being the actuality of God in 
the world. Moreover, this must be the case for his christology to be 
judged consistent with Chalcedon which ... is a strictly dialectical 
confession. "7 
But there is more to this difference than a question of emphasis. 
There is a fundamental antithesis between these theologies of symbol. 
Haight's comment begs the real issue of how to understand the dia-
lectic between symbol and symbolized, between, as he puts it, the "is" 
and the " is not." Both theologies of symbol were developed to address 
that very issue. The difficulty is that Tillich 's notion of symbol, and 
Hajght's appropriation of it, rules out-and is intended to rule out-a 
priori the very conception of symbol and symbolic that Rahner' s theory 
seeks to legitimate. 
For theological , ontological , and christological reasons, Tillich 
maintains, and Haight with him, that the symbolized points beyond 
itself to something else. This precludes any sort of proper identity be-
tween symbol and symbolized. There can be no direct or literal sense 
in whjch one could say that the symbol "is" the symbolized. The "is 
not" always trumps the "is." Properly speaking, Jesus is a man not 
God. For TiUich, both the Protestant principle's stricture against idolatry 
and the infinite qualitative difference between finite beings and the 
ground of being require thjs . "That which is the true ultimate," TiUich 
emphasizes, "transcends the realm of finjte reality infinitely. There-
fore, no finite reality can express it directly and properly."8 Both Haight 
and Tillich insist that the integrity of Jesus' historical existence re-
quires an uncompromising affirmation of hi s humanity. To say that 
christology is dialectical means for them that the identity between Jesus 
and God can be no more than the sort of transparency by which any 
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finite reality, in principle, can point beyond itself to the ground of 
being. 
Neither Haight, nor Tillich, intends by this restriction to deny the 
appropriateness of affirming that Jesus is truly symbol of God. Haight 
takes pains to stress that it is indeed God who is encountered in Jesus; 
that God is uniquely-even though not exclusively-encountered in 
him; and that the point of explaining how Jesus, as symbol , mediates 
God is to facilitate the worship of God in him, not to undermine it. 
Nevertheless, it is only in pointing beyond himself and his humanity 
that Jesus mediates God. It is only in that qualified sense that he can 
be called divine or worshiped. Haight is emphatic: "One must recog-
nize immediately that as a human being Jesus is Jesus, is not God, but 
points away from himself to God. Only then can the human mind be-
gin to recognize certain contours of God within the reality of Jesus."9 
Hence, Haight, following Tillich, uses "symbol ," "symbolic," and 
"dialectical" restrictively. The terms designate "mediation" of the di-
vine but always with the qualification, in Tillich 's language, of the 
"absolute break" and "infinite jump" between symbol and what it sym-
bolizes. 'o 
One can find wording in Rahner that might appear equivalent to 
Haight's definition of a symbol "as something that mediates some-
thing other than itself."" Likewise, Rahner's language might also seem 
to suggest that "a symbol makes present something else."'2 Rahner' s 
conception of the symbol , however, is not derived from a phenom-
enological account of the relation between symbol and symbolized. 
Penetrating the point of Rahner's notion is clearly a situation where 
Haight's principle of genetic hermeneutics should apply. A genetic 
approach interprets a concept's sense by tracing the development of 
the meanings that generated it. Explanations that contradict the inten-
tionality of the originating logic are deemed unwarranted. 
So what explains the genesis of Rahner's notion? "What is going 
on in this development? Why is this move being made rather than 
another? What is at stake in this theological decision?" 13 Rahner was 
quite explicit about this in his seminal essay on "The Theology of 
Symbol." '4 He was looking for a more original explanation of the 
relation between symbol and symbolized than the phenomenological 
traces of its mediation that Haight and Tillich chart. He believed he 
found such an explanation in the insight that beings themselves are-
and even being itself is-symbolic. 
68 ROBERT A1ASSON 
Every being, he argued, consists of a plurality in unity. The plural 
elements can be distinguished frorp the underlying unity that they ex-
press, and in that sense the plurality can be considered a kind of "other" 
or "otherness." But it is an "otherness" intrinsic to the unity and ex-
pressive of it-the way embodiment (the body itself and bodily ges-
tures) expresses a person. On the one hand, the only access to persons 
is in their embodiment. We are our bodies. On the other hand, there is 
something fundamentally dialectical about personal embodiment. We 
are not simply our bodies. One can-and indeed must-distinguisb 
between persons and their embodiments. In extreme situations (for 
example, such as deception, mental illness, the influence of pain, drugs, 
or stress, or in death) bodily expressions are in varying degrees no 
longer properly speaking a person's self-expression or embodiment. 
Hence there are genuine and proper senses in which what confronts us 
in the body and embodiment both "is" and "is not" the person himself 
or herself. Rahner contends that something like this is true of the rela-
tion between plurality and unity in all beings.'5 
For Haight and Tillich, symbol mediates something other than it-
self. For Rahner, symbol , in the most original and basic sense, is the 
otherness of a being itself through which the being is expressed. The 
"otherness" is not, as Haight says undialectically, "something else." 
This most basic "othemess"-what Rahner calls Rea/symbol to dis-
tinguish it from more derivative instances of the symboUc-both "is" 
and "is not" identical with the symbolized. Ironically, Rahner's posi-
tion is more complex, more dialectical than Haight' s and Tillich's. 
His aim is to explain how the identity both "is" and "is not" at the 
same time. He argues against expectations that for such Realsymbols 
unity and diversity correlate in like, not inverse, proportion.'6 Hence 
his point is to legitimate a kind of identity between symbol and sym-
bolized, which Haight and Tillich bar on principle. 
Rahner argues further, appealing to the doctrine of the Trinity, that 
divine be-ing itself is symbolic in this sense. This is clearly the antith-
esis ofTillich's theological and philosophical convictions. God is not 
symbolic for him. Being itself is beyond the polarities of finite beings 
that enable one thing to symbolize another, and that enable all things, 
in so far as they point beyond themselves to their ground, to symbol-
ize the ground itself. Rahner, too, stresses that God is not another be-
ing in the world, alongside it, or even beyond it. But Rahner does not 
conclude that the qualitative difference between God and creature re-
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stricts the logic of symbol in the same way. Hence, he does not en-
dorse at all the kind of "symbol ic realism" advocated by Haight. Rather, 
the point of Rahner' s theology of symbol is to provide a prulosophical 
rationale for conceptions of "dialectic," "symbolic," and "symbolic 
realism," wruch clearly differs from and stands opposed to what Haight 
intends by these notions. Rahner' s point is not simply to emphasize 
the "is" at the expense of the "is not." His point is to argue that a very 
different logic (or dialectic) applies in trus situation-one in which 
symbolized and symbol, unity and distinction, divine and human, con-
trary to expectations, are not reduced to one or the other, not harmo-
nized in an artificial resolution, and not played in opposition to one 
another as properly "other" and different. 
Given the genesis and contrary thrust of Rahner's theology of sym-
bol , I conclude that although Haight uses language that often is simi-
lar to Rahner's, Haight cannot legitimately appeal , at least without 
further and substantial clarification, to Rahner' s position, or the many 
theologies inspired by it, to warrant his position. This also raises more 
fundamental questions about Haight's critique and reinterpretation of 
Rahner's christology than Haight acknowledges in his publications. 
Likewise, it requires much clearer distinctions between the various 
senses of "symbol," "symbolic," "symbolic realism," and "dialecti-
cal" in our ongoing discussions of the logic of Christian talk about 
Jesus' significance. Otherwise our theological discussions will result 
in an obfuscation of what Christians are about in such di scourse rather 
than lead to the sort of clarification for wruch Haight rightly calls. 
Symbolic and Metaphoric Readings 
Although such qualifications bring us to the nub of contention 
between Tillich's and Rahner's theologies of symbol , this does not 
yet elucidate the difference between Haight' s symbolic libretto for 
christology and the case for a metaphoric reading. Nor does it clarify 
the most basic difference between Tillich 's and Rahner's understand-
ings of the logic of theological predication. The terms Rahner typi-
cally uses to describe such di scourse are "analogical ," "transcen-
dental ," and "mystagogical," not "symbolic." These preferences 
signify further divergences that need explanation. As Haight remarks, 
symbol.ic knowledge can be defined and distinguished from meta-
phor and other forms of speech in a variety of ways. There is no 
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standard usage.17 A more differentiated account is required. 
When Christians seek to articulate the significance of Jesus, they 
are forced inevitably to stretch the'available language and conceptual 
frameworks. That happens already in the scriptures. Followers of Jesus 
have an arsenal of linguistic tools at their disposal for this: not only 
symbol and literal speech but metaphor, parable, allegory, analogy, 
personification , paradox, myth, poetry, narratives of various kinds, 
and so on. The later christological controversies can be viewed in part 
as efforts at dealing with this diversity. They attempt to distinguish 
when language is stretched too far and when not far enough; to di s-
cern when the stretching is revealing and when obfuscating; and to 
decide what stretching of language, generated in particular communi-
ties and circumstances, is acceptable to broader communities of belief 
in different contexts, and what is not tolerable. It should be admitted 
that any attempt to account for this exceedingly rich play of language 
and arduous communal discernment under a single rubric, whether 
"symbolic" or "metaphoric," risks oversimplification and distortion. 
Such theories must be advanced with reservations and modesty. But 
still an accounting of how language and thinking can be legitimately 
stretched is necessary, and unavoidable. We must have such an ac-
count if we are to make judgments about the logical limits of such 
linguistic and conceptual moves, or to settle interpretative questions 
about the "point" of particular terms and formulations, or to develop a 
hermeneutics to help adjudicate between alternative ways of speaking 
and thinking about God and Jesus. 
Gerhart and RusseLL 
The advantage of the theory of metaphoric process advanced by 
Gerhart and Russell is that it focuses particularly on the epistemologi-
cal moves in religion and science in which genuinely new possibilities 
for understanding and meaning emerge. Put very simply, their theory 
envisions situations in which a novel analogy is forced between two 
notions in our available world of meanings. 
Their argument presupposes that our inquiries about the world and 
ourselves take place in what can be imagined as cognitive spaces or 
worlds of meanings. These worlds of meanings are made up of net-
works of interrelated concepts. Physics, theology, a religion, and com-
mon sense as defined by a particular time and culture are examples of 
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such fields of meanings. The concepts within these fields do not stand 
directly for things in themselves, but for our notions of these things. 
These notions are defined by their interrelation with other notions. 
For example, to get some conception of "house," one must have other 
notions available (lumber, bricks, wall, window, roof, and so forth). 
These other notions are variable, as well as the relations between 
them, so meaning "arises out of the interaction of concepts and rela-
tions, and is expressed in the topography of the field. Necessary con-
cept changes, such as those which might arise from a new experi-
ence, alter relations; and changes in relations, such as occur when 
one attempts to understand an experience in a new way, relocate old 
concepts." 18 
Gerhart and Russell speak of an analogy as "forced" when it in-
volves an affirmation of an identity between two "knowns" that, given 
current understandings, is unwarranted. In the world of Copernicus, 
for example, the affirmation that the sun and not the earth is the center 
was uncalled for. In Newton's world, to afflrm that the laws of heaven 
and the laws of earth are the same was unreasonable. In the world of 
meanings available to Palestinian Jews at the time of Jesus' death, the 
warrants for identifying him as the Messiah were questionable at best. 
The first thing that distinguishes these particular analogies is that, 
despite their apparent unreasonableness, forcing them does not result 
in nonsense. Quite to the contrary, twisting accustomed meanings in 
these situations opens up possibilities for understanding that had not 
been available before, just as stretching the elements of musical com-
position can create a new idiom such as jazz. 
The second thing that distinguishes such uncalled-for analogies is 
the disruptive effect on the fields of meanings associated with them. 
Copernicus's insistence that the sun is the center, or Newton 's insis-
tence that the laws of terrestrial motion are identical with the laws of 
planetary motion, changed related notions within physics in most fun-
damental ways.19 So the force of the analogies did not simply add new 
information to the world of physics, expanding it the way the discov-
ery of a new planet or a new mechanical law might have. Nor did it 
clarify the given world of meanings, the wayan apt analogy between 
something known and something unknown might have. By Newton's 
time both Galileo's and Kepler's laws already were known. The un-
called-for analogies had a more "tectonic" or "metaphoric" effect be-
cause they forced a reconfiguration in the until-then accepted fields of 
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meanings. The result was newly shaped fields of meanings that con-
stitute a better understanding of what we know of reality.20 
This effect-the creation of significant changes in fields of mean-
ings-I take to be the fundamental characteristic of the metaphoric 
analogy. That is what distinguishes it from rhetorical moves we more 
commonly label "metaphor" or "metaphorical" in which forcing a new 
analogy extends the meaning of terms within a field of meanings but 
does not reshape the field of meanings itself. (In Gerhart and Russell's 
theory "metaphoric" and "metaphorical" are not equivalent. And on 
their accounting many metaphors are not genuinely metaphoric be-
cause they do not create the possibility for new meaning by creating 
fundamental shifts in our fields of meanings.) 
For example, the affLrmation that "Jesus is the Messiah" effects 
such a change in fields of meanings. Given the images current in the 
eschatology of the day, affirming that God was victorious in the cruci-
fied son of a carpenter from Nazareth was uncalled for. In fact most of 
the key eschatological images by which Jesus is identified in the gos-
pels have something of this metaphoric dimension. By ordinary logic 
he was not a victorious King of Israel; he was not a Son of Man who 
descended gloriously from the heavens; he was not acknowledged by 
his people nor did he vanquish their enemies. To affirm that Jesus is 
the Messiah is to force an analogy between him and Israel's expres-
sions of hope and trust in God. This in tum requires a different under-
standing of God, Israel's hope, and Jesus. Affmning that Jesus is the 
Messiah, if taken seriously, forces a thoroughgoing revision of the 
field of meanings operative in Palestinian Judaism, or at least those 
operative in the narrative worlds of the New Testament. 
This leads us to the third factor that distinguishes the metaphoric 
process. The shifts of meaning entailed in it typically make a new 
logic available. Conceptual moves are possible in Einstein's world 
that were inconceivable in Newton 's, and moves in Newton's world 
would not have made sense in Galileo's. Likewise, the affirmation 
that Jesus is Messiah reconfigures the meaning of "Messiah," the iden-
tity of Jesus, and the field of meanings associated with messianic hope. 
This makes possible a logical move otherwise unavailable and lays 
the groundwork for later moves otherwise unthinkable. 
Several entaiJments of this conceptual step are noteworthy. First, 
there is no hedging of the "is" in the claim "Jesus is Messiah." The 
logic of this move loses its force if Jesus is not in some sense properly 
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and literally the Messiah. I use "litera]" here purposefully but advis-
edly. The conception of metaphoric process destabilizes the meaning 
of "literal" itself and warrants this qualified use. Although reference 
to the literal meaning often presupposes that exact and primary mean-
ings are univocal and constant, and that fields of meanings are stable, 
the metaphoric process demonstrates that this is not always the case. 
In a metaphoric affirmation words come to have new exact and pri-
mary meanmgs. Moreover, these meanings can be semantically proper, 
10gicaJly warranted, and factually the case-three further important 
denotations of "literaL" After Thompson and Joule, heat is motion. 
After Einstein, it is literally true that the speed of light is the same for 
all observers. For those whose world of meanings has been transformed 
by the gospel, Jesus is the Messiah. 
Second, this is possible only if one allows for the fundamental shifts 
in fields of meanings. For those who got the point of the surprising 
affmnation, Jesus redefines what it is to be Messiah, just as the con-
cept Messiah redefines Jesus' identity. Moreover, the fields of mean-
ings associated with messianic expectation, Jesus, and God's relation 
to humanity are transformed. Hence, reception is always a crucial di-
mension in the metaphoric process. The point of the affirmation will 
be missed if the hearer is unable or unwilhng to recognize the intrinsic 
changes in these fields of meanings. 
This would be the case, for example, if a secular historian under-
stood the predication univocally and so concluded that it is an analogy 
that in some ways is justified, in other ways not. This would also be 
the case if the affirmation is taken, whether by an historically naive 
believer or skeptic, as asserting a univocal, non-metaphoric identifi-
cation of Jesus and the Messiah. Both people would miss the 
affirmation's logical significance. A univocal and literal reading in 
that sense-a reading that does not negotiate the entailed shifts in fields 
of meanmgs-will mistake the logic of the predication. Therefore, 
recognizing Jesus as the Messiah requires what the prophets had called 
teshuva, a fundamental "turning" or conversion in thinking and in iden-
tity.21 
It was a shift in conception and identity that many at the time could 
not see or accept, a shift that many of Jesus ' followers apparently 
found difficult, and a shift whose far-reaching implications plainly 
were not at all clear, at first, even to those who affirmed it. The logic 
was not patently exphcit, conscious, or transparent. Nevertheless, the 
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metaphoric point of this predication is neither to deny the identity nor 
restrict its significance but to open up a logical space that enables us to 
say more than would be possible' if the predication were interpreted as 
either merely univocal (is) or merely dialectical (is not). 
The Metaphoric Character of Rahner's Thought 
Gerhart and Russell's conception of the metaphoric process pro-
vides. an \l\uminating elC.'j}tanation of the togic entaited in Rohner' s 
appeal to the "analogical" and "transcendental" character of God-talk. 
His performance is more subtle, innovative, and effective than his own 
explanations. Inattention to such unarticulated but fundamental moves 
in his thought is the source of significant misunderstanding among 
some commentators and critics. For one thing, Rahner holds that "anal-
ogy" and "transcendental" are themselves analogous and transcen-
dental conceptions. Pinning down their precise meaning and demon-
strating that it is metaphoric requires attentive and extended analysis . 
For the present purposes a brief overview of this claim and its justifi-
cation must suffice.22 
If one steps back from what Rahner says about analogous and tran-
scendental statements and then exarnines how he actually uses such 
language, it becomes clear that he is forcing an analogy. The effect is 
to open up new fields of meanings and so a new logical and grammati-
cal space in which it is possible to speak meaningfully of God, though 
in a qualified, indirect, and somewhat apophatic way. Rahner insists 
that this does not entail any grasping of God in concepts. His move is 
a metaphoric act grounded in a very different understanding of how 
we think and signify God in the [lIst place. This does not entail affirm-
\.n~ that God lS In some wa'is t\k.e and \n some wa'iS dilie-rent from 
some putatlve analogue. LiKe l:l\\icn and 1:\aignt, ne -reslsts the claim 
that concepts can grasp God in that way at all . But unlike Tillich' s and 
Haight' s restrictive views of the range of predication, Rahner's argu-
mentation reveals that he thinks we can force language as we nor-
mally use it to different purposes, shifting our fields of meanings as 
they apply to God, so that conceptual room can be open for saying 
something meaningful and substantive tbat grasps at God witbout 
grasping God. 
More specifically (although Rahner does not put it this way him-
self) the transcendental argument in its most basic conceptual move 
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forces an analogy between two known elements that require a shift in 
our fields of meanings. This opens up possibilities for predication oth-
erwise unavai lable and unthinkable. The first known is what Rahner 
caUs "transcendental" intentionality- the reflexive, indirect, and dy-
namic presence-to-self and anticipation (Vorgrif.!) of the horizon of 
knowing, love, and freedom. The second known is the more direct 
grasp of specific objects as known, loved, and affirmed in freedom, 
what he calls "categorial" intentionality. 
Rahner forces an analogy by insisting that the model for knowing 
and speaJUng of God is transcendental intentionality rather than 
categorial intentionality, and by insisting that the former is not a de-
rivative, secondary , or inferior activ ity , but the primary and ground-
ing manifestation of the human spirit. Forcing this analogy-that is to 
say, speaking of God as "transcendental reality"-<:reates a logical 
space for talking about God, while insisting that God is the goal and 
presupposition of human intentionality and never its object, and un-
derlines that God is always beyond our grasp. The logic of God-talk, 
for Rahner, is governed by the intrinsic reflexivity and indirectness of 
this metaphoric signification. If this is forgotten, one falls into the 
mistaken notion that transcendental reality is a transcendental "ob-
ject" that can be known, spoken of, or described in the way we know 
and speak about categorial objects. 
Rahner is able to show that a similar logic applies to other tran-
scendental "realities," such as the self or freedom, that are real and 
that can be the grammatical objects of our predications even though 
they are not entities perceptible by the senses. People do indeed speak 
of such "things" as if they were objects in that sense. Moreover, people 
take them as "real ." But even though people might not be able to ex-
plain why, most would recognize the inappropriateness of questions 
about the physical location of the self, its size, weight, color, taste, or 
smeU. There is something metaphoric going on in much of our every-
day talk about realities such as the "self," even though we do not nor-
mally call attention to this "stretching" of language and are not di s-
comforted by its peculiar logic. 
Rahner's use of "Holy Mystery," " nameless whither," "horizon," 
and "asymptotic goal" as terms for God is meant to call attention to 
such a metaphoric shift in signification and logic. Moreover, charac-
teristic of metaphoric signification, the act of affi rming that God is 
transcendental reality effects fundamental and global changes in the 
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available theological and philosophical fields of meanings. Rahner 
seeks to exploit these meanings in hi s various theological investiga-
tions. We have already seen him do this in his theology of symbol. His 
affirmation that beings, and indeed being itself, are symbolic is itself a 
metaphoric proposal. Accepting his suggestion forces a reconfiguration 
of what symbol is, of how beings and being itself are, and of the fields 
of meanings associated with each of these notions. Moreover, this 
reconfiguration of fields of meanings makes available a logic in which, 
contrary to expectations, symbol and symbolized are not opposed, in-
deed in which unity and diversity correlate in like, rather than inverse, 
proportion. 
It is true that Rahner explains and achieves this metaphoric move 
within the context of his rather cerebral transcendental metaphysics. 
He was inspired by Aquinas, who achieved a similar innovation in an 
earlier philosophical context, quite different from our so-called post-
modern world of meanings . Aquinas also required a significant 
reconfiguration of the inteUectual idioms of his day. Following Gerhart 
and Russell, however, it can be argued that the metaphoric process 
that their theologies exempli fy is a more general epistemological ac-
tivity entailed in the expansion of religious and theological under-
standing as well as other forms of scientific and artistic understand-
ing. 
Such moves are not a priori inimical to the sort of "intelligibility in 
today's world" that Haight argues must be a crucial criterion for 
christology. Contemporary belief structures, particularly those that have 
created the possibility for new horizons of human understanding, are 
built on such cognitive shifts in our fields of meaning. This argues for 
a significant qualification of Haight's insistence that "one cannot logi-
cally affirm a belief that stands in contradiction with what one knows 
to be true in a wider context" and that "the principle of non-contradic-
tion rules out a compartmentalization of christological beliefs held in 
a private sphere that do not correlate with what we positively know to 
be the case from other spheres of life. "23 This norm can be granted, but 
only so long as one takes into consideration those significant meta-
phoric acts in other spheres of life that reveal knowing as a process in 
which our fields of meanings can be meaningfuUy stretched to unex-
pected uses, and our logic twisted in uncalled-for but warrantably pro-
ductive ways. This qualification must be part of the equation, as well , 
in the application of Haight's positive articulation of the criterion: that 
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"one's christological faith should find expression in belief structures 
or ways of understanding that fit or correspond with the way reality is 
understood generally in a given culture."24 A restrictive theory of the 
symbolic that a priori rules out the metaphoric in theology and reli-
gion, or that relegates it to the non-cognitive and poetic, ignores the 
significance of the metaphoric as a legitimate cognitive process in the 
sciences and arts. 
As I read them, Tillich and Haight also seek to force an analogy 
when they claim that all talk of God is symbolic. Establishing this 
reading is not necessary for the further development of the case I am 
making for a metaphoric reading of christological symbols, but it does 
provide an occasion to stress that making a metaphoric move does not 
require an awareness that one is doing so or a commitment to a theory 
such as Gerhart and Russell's. It also calls attention to the difference 
between recognizing a move as metaphoric and judging it true or as 
the most helpful conceptual move. Clarifying precisely how 
christological predications logically function, whether as metaphoric 
or symbolic in the various senses we have examined, is a crucial step 
toward interpreting their meaning, but it is still preliminary to deter-
mining their truth. Our concern is with the question "What kind of 
truth?" and so bears more indirectly on the question "Is it true?" 
Hermeneutical Implications of a Metaphoric Reading 
If the logic of christological predication is metaphoric in the sense 
I have argued, rather than restrictively symbolic, Haight's genetic 
hermeneutics loses much of its force. He acknowledges that his inter-
pretation.presupposes his theory of symbol as the only viable alterna-
tive either to literal readings, which he contends are today historically 
implausible, or to highly speculative metaphysical readings, which he 
maintains are at best problematic for postmodern consciousness. But 
a metaphoric libretto such as I have proposed here makes possible yet 
another construal. The scope of this essay permits little more than this 
bare suggestion itself and some of its hermeneutical implications. The 
significant hi storical issues related to this claim or to Haight ' s 
christo logical interpretations must be left to other occasions and to 
those with appropriate expertise. 
The focal point of contention follows directly from what has been 
argued. If metaphoric acts in religion, theology, or other sc iences can 
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sometimes adventitiously create the possibility for affirming an iden-
tity claim (a metaphoric analogy) that otherwise would have been un-
available and unthinkable, it has to be asked if similar conceptual moves 
could not have been entailed in scripture and in the earl y refl ections of 
the church that prepared the grounds for the formulations of Chalcedon 
and Nicaea. 
This contrasts with Haight 's interpretation of Jesus as the "Wis-
dom of God" and "Logos of God." The wisdom christology, he ob-
serves " is often considered a bridge to a full y three-stage, incarnational 
understanding of a pre-existent Jesus Christ. "25 The logos chri stology 
"both resembles the other wisdom chri stologies and transcends them 
in the direction of an explicit statement of the incarnation of an hy-
postatized being."26 He maintains that "what is happening in the de-
velopment of the earlier wisdom chri stology is evident: 'What Juda-
ism said of Sophia, Christian hymn-makers and epistle writers now 
come to say of Jesus. ' "27 This conceptual move paved the way for 
later assertions of Jesus' pre-existence, but in Haight's scenario those 
later moves were not justified by the intentionality of the scriptural 
texts that generated them. The originating meaning was very different 
and contradicts the later, since the referent of these affirmations was 
the hi storical Jesus of Nazareth seen symbolically as a personification 
and revelation of God. The referent was not a pre-existent being in 
identity with God. 
And what do these assertions mean? . .. James Dunn, for ex-
ample, recognizes that in hi s wisdom chri stology Paul wanted to 
show that Jesus is the new and exhaustive embodiment of divine 
wisdom. He admits that Matthew transcends hi s source Q, where 
Jesus is a messenger of wisdom, and identifies Jesus with 
wisdom. It is clear that Jesus is being equated with the personi-
fication of God' s wisdom in the hymns like that of Colossians. 
Moreover, thi s metaphorical language of personification finally 
led to a chri stology in which Jesus is different in kind from other 
mediations of God, and enjoys a metaphysically divine status of 
personal pre-existence. But Dunn fail s to find in the Jewish 
tradition prior to Jesus any consideration of wisdom as a hyposta-
sis or di vine being; thi s would not fit with Jewish monotheism. 
Wisdom language remains fi gurati ve personification. It is thus at 
least ambiguous that pre-ex istence represents the intention of 
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these wisdom christologies, because one cannot really show that 
thi s is more than the figurative language of metaphor and 
personification . Is there a way out of this impasse?28 
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Haight responds "yes" and proposes that the issue can be sorted 
out hermeneutically. His first move is to argue that the historical Jesus 
of Nazareth is the primary referent of such affi rmations. He next notes 
that in such wisdom sayings the central theme is Jesus' role as one 
who "reveals both the true nature of human existence and also the 
nature of God."29 Haight reasons that the personification borrowed 
from wisdom language should be interpreted in thi s light. "These texts 
are not providing unknowable information about transcendent reali-
ties from some secret source of knowledge. The epistemology of these 
christologies begins from below, with Jesus, and their content is based 
on the encounter of God in and through Jesus."30 So, he concludes, the 
affirmations are symbolic: Jesus points to God but is not literally iden-
tified with God and does not pre-exist in identity with God . The 
affi rmations are symbolic in this restrictive sense for two reasons: first, 
because it is language about transcendental reality and, second, be-
cause "thi s is consciously developed language of personification."3l 
On more careful analysis, the second reason is little more than a 
variation on the first. Throughout Haight's work , it is clear that he 
understands metaphor and personification in terms of hi s theory of the 
symbolic. He notes early in the book that "descriptions of how meta-
phor functions resemble the dynamics of symbols."32 In his under-
staniling, the logic of metaphor and personification presuppose the 
fundamental non-identity between the realities compared. They are 
analogies in the common sense-not metaphoric. One term (or per-
haps both terms) communicates information about the other. In so 
doing, the analogies may introduce paradox, tension, and ambiguity 
into the meanings of the terms themselves, but the analogies do not 
create fundamental changes in the fields of meanings or create the 
possibility for new logical relations between them. They do not force 
a new identity . So Haight tells us: 
I indicated earli er how in a metaphor one thing is identified with 
something different, as in "My husband is a bear." What imme-
diately strikes the li stener or reader is the non-identity between 
the implicitly pared items. The creati ve imagination is thus set in 
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motion to formulate the similarity or point of identity: is he a 
teddy or a grizzly? So too, analogously, to say that Jesus is a 
parable of God introduces paradox, tension, and ambiguity in 
Jesus' mediation of God. One must recognize immediately that 
as a human being Jesus is Jesus, is not God, but points away from 
himself to God.33 
A similar logic applies in his interpretation of personification in 
the Hebrew scriptures: 
In some instances these metaphorical symbols in the Hebrew 
scriptures are personified, and this personification became a very 
significant factor in the development of christological and 
trinitarian doctrine. Personification is a figure of speech: the 
literal meaning of a personification, that is, the meaning intended 
by the au thor of the personification, is not that the "hands of God" 
refer to two actual hands, or that the Word of God is something 
really distinct from God. When the metaphorical character of 
personification is not respected, when it becomes hypostatized, 
that is, conceived as objective and individual, in the same 
measure the power of the symbol tends to be undermined. The 
symbol can then be made to point to something distinct from 
God, which in its tum acts as an intermediary between God and 
the world. God 's transcendence and immanence in the world 
become separated and competitive; God, as holy and transcen-
dent, cannot be mixed up in this world but needs a messenger, an 
angel, a Word. This goes against the primitive intention of the 
symbol as referring in its first instance simply to God experi-
enced in the world.34 
But do such metaphors always refer simply to God as experienced 
in the world in that restrictive way? I suggested earlier that identifying 
Jesus as Messiah is not a metaphor in the manner Haight defines, but 
metaphoric in Gerhart and Russell 's sense. It opens up and requires a 
new way of conceiving Jesus, messianic hope, and God 's relation to 
humanity. With thi s shift in fields of meanings, a new logic applies; 
one can say properly and literally that Jesus is Messiah. Christians 
proclaim nothing less. They do not proclaim him as a "sort of' Mes-
siah. 
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It is reasonable to suppose that a similar logical move is involved 
in PhiJippians, Colossians, and the prologue to the Gospel of John-
their authors were forcing new analogies stretching the available fields 
of meanings and logical relations between them. If they were doing 
something of the sort, it would not require that Jewish tradition prior 
to Jesus had available thjs sense of wisdom as a pre-existent hyposta-
sis or divine being; nor would it require that the authors intended to 
appeaJ to such meanjngs. The point of a metaphoric analogy is to cre-
ate conceptual room to say what could not have otherwise been srud 
by forcing language and logic to a new use. There is as much evidence 
for the claim that the disciples' reflection on a deeper level of their 
experience of Jesus forced such a metaphoric expansion of the avruJ-
able language and logic, as there is for Hrught' s assumption that what 
followers of Jesus could have intended to say was restricted to the 
fields of meanings available before such a metaphoric act or limited to 
what would have been conceivable to those whose experience did not 
force and warrant such a metaphoric process. 
The tension between the historical Jesus and what is affirmed of 
him in worship and scripture-and eventually in creed-supports the 
metaphoric reading just as much as it supports Haight's restrictive 
symbolic reading; it explains better the reaJism of the c1rums that Jesus 
is Lord, the Word made flesh , and the image of the invisible God, the 
firstborn of all creation. A metaphoric reaJism, like Haight's symbolic 
reading, would insist that the logic of christology begins from below 
with Jesus and with the historicaJ encounter of Jesus. By invoking 
such reaJism, we would concur with Hrught: 
It is .mistaken to read thi s wisdom language as though it were 
strrughtforward descriptive language that told the story of a 
divine being that descended to become Jesus. To understand this 
language as descriptive language about a being who is "on the 
side of the creator in the creator-creature distinction" is to 
misinterpret the kind of language that is being used and its 
epistemological provenance. These texts are not providing un-
knowable information about transcendent realities from some 
secret source of knowledge. The epistemology of these 
christologies begins from below, with Jesus, and their content is 
based on the encounter of God in and through Jesus. Their 
revelatory character in epistemologicaJ terms is ascending. To 
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the question about God and what God is like, these texts testify 
that Jesus mediates an answer. God is encountered in Jesus; God 
is revealed in Jesus; God is likeJesus; the wisdom of God is made 
manjfest in Jesus; Jesus is the wisdom of God. Jesus himself 
responds to the questions, what is God 's wisdom and where is it 
found?35 
But a metaphoric reading would not concur with the conclusion 
that talk of Jesus as God 's word incarnate is thereby illegitimate. Nor 
would a metaphoric reading require us to conclude that subsequently 
drawing implications for our understanding of God as triune is unwar-
ranted. if such claims are metaphoric and if thjs metaphoric act is 
justified, then within that context there is a warrant for the proper use 
of such language and justification for predications that involve more 
than the symbolic meanings envisioned by Haight. While Haight's 
symbolic reading enables a vigorous affirmation of Jesus ' historical 
reality, that reading severely restricts the divine. God and God ' s rela-
tion to creation seem bound by the logic that constrains beings and the 
relations between beings. This appears to be at the root of hi s objec-
tion that Rahner's Logos christology undermines the afflrmation of 
Jesus' full humanity: 
But despite hi s intentions and his strong affi rmations of Jesus' 
real humanity, the suspicions arise at several points. Jesus is not 
like us insofar as God is present to Jesus as Logos and God is 
present to us as Spirit. in other words, God' s presence as Logos 
to Jesus is a qualitatively different mode of presence than God 's 
union with human beings generally. It seems metaphysically 
inconceivable that thi s different presence to Jesus would not 
make a substantial , ontological difference in him relative to 
God 's presence to us. It would be an odd metaphysics that could 
imagine God assuming a human nature without ontologically 
transformjng that human nature.36 
It is an odd metaphysics only if one assumes that the same logic 
applies between God and beings as between beings themselves, only 
if one assumes that God is a competing part of nature or of the world, 
and only if one assumes that God ' s agency in the world is like other 
kinds of agency. Despite Haight' s and Tillich ' s strong afftrmations to 
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the contrary, their symbolic reading of incarnation has the simi larly 
odd character of treating the di stinction between God and creatures as 
if it were like other distinctions. They insist that in the case of God, as 
in other cases, the "is" and "is not" must be either harmonized or dif-
ferent. 
But are those the only two choices? A metaphoric reading would 
say no, and question whether Haight's symbolic reali sm takes seri-
ously enough the uniqueness of the di stinction between God and what 
is not God. The metaphoric libretto would argue along with Robert 
Sokolowski that the Christian sense of God entails a unique distinc-
tion between the divine and non-divine and that "once thi s new con-
text is reached, new 'kinds' of differences become avai lable" that were 
not available within philosophical and religious conceptual frameworks 
prior to Christianity.37 It is precisely this distinction in the notion of 
divinity and this new conceptual framework, and not just the status of 
Jesus, that Sokolowski argues was at stake in the christological con-
troversies. The councils required a new understanding of the logic of 
Christian talk about God and Jesus: 
... They teU us that we must think of God as the one who can let 
natural necessity be maintained and let reason be left intact: that 
is, God is not himself a competing part of nature or a part of the 
world. If the incarnation could not take place without a truncation 
of human nature, it would mean that God was one of the natures 
in the world that somehow was defined by not being the other 
natures; it would mean that his presence in one of these other 
natures, human nature, would involve a conflict and a need to 
exclude some part of what he is united with .... But the Christian 
God is not a part of the world and is not a "kind" of being at all . 
Therefore the incarnation is not meaningless or impossible or 
destructi ve. 38 
Does Haight worry about God 's transcendence and immanence in 
the world becoming separated and competitive in hypostatized sym-
bols because he has missed, and indeed precluded as possible, the 
di stinction (the metaphoric shift) that Sokolowski discerns as a key 
insight emerging from the classical christological controversies? Is it 
not reasonable to view the innovations of wisdom and logos christology 
in the first centuries as forcing an analogy and warranting a logic that 
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open up the possibility for affirming both the identity between Jesus 
and God, and the integrity of Jesus' humanity?-both the "is" and the 
" is not" at once? 
This short paper cannot settle the question. It has barely sketched 
the outline of a constructive alternative for explaining the logic of 
Christian talk about Jesus' signi ficance. An adequate critique of 
Haight's response to the question would require more substantial analy-
sis, as would a defense of a metaphoric reali sm. I can only hope that I 
have played out enough of the overture to suggest the crucial themes 
in the proposed metaphoric libretto and score. 
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